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Abstract.  
Most of the money in circulation is created by commercial 
banks, and it is precisely that form of money creation that 
explains most bank failures. In contrast, full reserve banking is 
a system under which that form of money is banned: all money 
is created by the central bank. There is a very simple reason 
for such a ban which most if not all advocates of full reserve 
seem to have missed, which is as follows.  
Under the existing bank system, those who deposit money at 
banks with a view to their bank lending on their money so as to 
earn interest are into commerce, in just the same way as 
where they deposit money with a stock-broker, mutual fund, 
private pension scheme or similar with a view to their money 
being loaned on or invested. And it is a widely accepted 
principle that taxpayers should not rescue commercial ventures 
which fail. Yet taxpayer backed deposit insurance is provided 
for those bank depositors. Thus if the latter principle were 
adhered to consistently, then there would be no deposit 
insurance for “interest earning” deposits, while of course totally 
safe non-interest earning deposits would be available for those 
who want them. And that “two types of deposit” system is what 
full reserve has always consisted of. 
The above point about commercial and non-commercial 
depositors is similar to, but not quite the same as the more 
conventional argument for full reserve, which is along the lines 
that governments cannot allow a series of major bank failures, 
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which inevitably means banks are featherbedded or subsidised 
(a non-commercial activity) thus some way must be found of 
removing that subsidy, and one way is full reserve. 
The first 1,300 or so words below briefly introduce full reserve. 
The basic argument put in this paper then starts under the 
heading “Taxpayers should not back commerce.” 
_________ 
 
Introduction.  
Full reserve banking is name for a bank system under which, to 
over-simplify, private/commercial banks cannot issue money: 
that is, all money is issued by central banks. Other phrases 
used to describe that system include “100% reserves”, 
“Sovereign Money” and “narrow banking”. 
The latter description of full reserve banking is “over-simple” in 
that there is no sharp dividing line between money and non-
money: almost anything can be used as money. To stretch the 
point, anyone can try using bottles of whiskey as money. Quite 
possibly using bottles of whiskey to pay for other goods should 
be classified as barter, but let’s overlook that technicality: the 
important point is that even where privately issued money is 
banned under full reserve, there will still be a number of assets 
which arguably count as money. 
However, there is an important distinction between those “other 
assets” on the one hand, and what counts as money when it 
comes to the monetary aggregates  which most countries 
periodically publish, which in turn is the same as what is 
counted as money in this paper. That is, in this paper, only 
assets which are government or taxpayer backed are counted 
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as money. To illustrate, $100 bills are guaranteed by the US 
government not to lose value (inflation apart). The same cannot 
be said of other strange bits of paper circulating on Wall Street 
which may serve the purpose of money.  
As to money issued by commercial banks under the existing 
bank system, that is also guaranteed by governments via 
deposit insurance. 
One justification for banning commercial bank issued money is 
that it is precisely the fact of issuing that money that makes 
those banks fragile, as suggested by Diamond (1999) in his 
abstract. To put that more bluntly, it is precisely the fact of 
letting private banks issue money that explains the 2007/8 bank 
crises and most other bank failures throughout history. It is true 
that other factors like house price bubbles, liar loans and 
excessive private debt are often cited as being the cause or 
contributory cause of bank failures. But as Kotlikoff (2018) 
rightly argues, those other factors are only contributory 
factors: they are not the root cause of the problem. 
The reason why letting private banks issue money makes them 
vulnerable is that money by its very nature is a short term 
liability of a bank: that is, where someone has money deposited 
in a bank, (i.e. they have opened a normal instant access / 
checking / current account) the bank is obliged to pay that 
money or some of it back to the depositor instantaneously if the 
depositor so wishes. Alternatively there are deposit / term 
accounts available at most banks, but much the same applies: 
the bank is obliged to repay relevant monies within a month or 
two where the money is in a one or two month term account. In 
contrast, banks make relatively long term loans. That is, banks 
engage in “borrow short and lend long” or “maturity 
transformation” to use the jargon.  
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But that activity is clearly risky: if too many of those a bank has 
borrowed from (i.e. depositors) withdraw their deposits, the 
bank may be in trouble, since it cannot demand money back 
from those it has granted long term loans to (e.g. mortgagors).  
Full reserve solves that problem by insisting that bank loans are 
funded only by shares in the bank, or by something that 
amounts to shares, e.g. stakes in a mutual fund / unit trust 
which specialises in granting mortgages. Under that sort of 
regime, if a bank or mutual fund makes silly loans and the value 
of its stock of loans drops to say 80% of book value, all that 
happens is that the shares or mutual fund stakes falls to about 
80% of book value. That is, the bank or mutual fund does not 
go bust: its liabilities do not exceed the value of its assets. 
As Selgin (1988) put it, “For a balance sheet without debt 
liabilities, insolvency is ruled out…”. (Incidentally, that was an 
aside made by Selgin: his book did not actually advocate full 
reserve). 
Full reserve is advocated for example by Cochrane (2013), 
Dyson (2012), Dyson (2016), Fisher (1936), Friedman (1960), 
Klein (2013), Kotlikoff (2012), Mellor (2016) and Werner (2011). 
Re the central claim of this paper, namely that advocates of full 
reserve do not seem to have grasped the importance of the 
distinction between bank customers who are into commerce 
and those who are not, I have actually searched for the words 
“commerce” and “commercial” in the latter eight works. While 
those words obviously appear quite frequently, there is no 
reference to the distinction between “commercial bank 
customers” and non-commercial ones, with one exception. That 
is Dyson (2016). Dyson does briefly allude to the fact that 
ordinary bank depositors are protected by taxpayer backed 
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deposit insurance, but that’s all. That is in his paragraph 
starting “The deposits created by banks…”.  
But Dyson does not actually say that it is not the job of 
taxpayers to stand behind what is clearly a form of commerce, 
namely depositors seeking to have their bank lend on their 
money for them. 
As for other words that might be used in place of “commercial” 
or derivatives of that word, it is not clear what those might be. 
Thus it very much looks like those who have advocated full 
reserve to date do not realize how crucial the distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial depositors is to the 
debate over full reserve. At the very least, that distinction 
seems to be under-appreciated in the literature. 
 
Would a partial ban on private money do? 
Having suggested above that having bank loans funded via 
equity rather than deposits stops banks going bust, there is a 
weakness in that idea, namely that as argued by Wolf (2017) 
and Admati (2013) it is not actually necessary to totally ban the 
issue of private money in order to makes banks safe. That is, 
as they argue, it is probably not necessary to raise the capital 
ratio of banks (or rather banks’ “lending departments”) to the 
100% level: around 20% would probably do.  
Given that Cochrane tends to stress the idea that avoiding bank 
failures is the main justification for full reserve, that is clearly a 
weakness in the Cochrane style “avoiding bank failures justifies 
full reserve” argument. 
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Private money creation equals a subsidy of private banks. 
There is however another reason for a total ban on commercial 
bank issued money, which is that money creation by those 
banks amounts to, or inevitably results in a subsidy of those 
banks. One of those subsidies is the well-known “too big to fail” 
subsidy. That is, banks for reasons given above are prone to 
failure, but a series of large bank failures cannot possibly be 
allowed, thus those banks are effectively backed by the state, 
which amounts to a subsidy. Therefor some sort system where 
no subsidy is involved must be found, and full reserve meets 
that need. 
Another form of subsidy was explained by Huber (2000, p.31), 
and that is that letting private banks create or “print” money 
amounts to a subsidy of those banks. 
As Huber puts it, “Allowing banks to create new money out of 
nothing enables them to cream off a special profit. They lend 
the money to their customers at the full rate of interest, without 
having to pay any interest on it themselves. So their profit on 
this part of their business is not, say, 9% credit-interest less 4% 
debit-interest = 5% normal profit; it is 9% credit-interest less 0% 
debit-interest = 9% profit = 5% normal profit plus 4% additional 
special profit. This additional special profit is hidden from bank 
customers and the public, partly because most people do not 
know how the system works, and partly because bank balance 
sheets do not show that some of their loan funding comes from 
money the banks have created for the purpose and some from 
already existing money which they have had to borrow at 
interest.” 
Put another way, private banks manage to get the profits from 
seigniorage to subsidise their money lending business. 
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Obviously commercial banks do not make a 9% profit (using 
Huber’s figures) on loans funded by freshly created money and 
a 5% profit on loans funded by deposits, bonds and so on. That 
is, banks no doubt use their freedom to create a certain amount 
of new money every year to increase their profits on all their 
loans (and/or cut the rate of interest charged on those loans). 
Huber’s point certainly ties up with the point made by Selgin 
(2012) in his opening paragraphs, namely that if commercial 
banks are allowed to create money in an economy which had 
previously just used base money (i.e. central bank created 
money), commercial banks manage to rob those holding base 
money (not that Selgin actually advocates full reserve in that 
work of his).  
 
Taxpayers should not back commerce. 
There is a widely accepted principle that it is not the job of 
taxpayers to bail out commercial ventures which fail. But in the 
case of banks, it is clear that people who deposit money at 
banks with the intention of those banks lend on that money so 
as to earn interest are into commerce. They are into commerce 
in exactly the same way as where they deposit money with a 
stock-broker, mutual fund or private pension scheme with the 
same end in view: that is, that the money is loaned on or 
invested so as to earn interest or dividends. Another example 
of money lending which comes to the same thing as depositing 
money at a bank is buying bonds in a non-bank corporation. 
Indeed, putting money into a two month term account at a bank 
comes to exactly the same thing as buying bonds which have 
two months till maturity in a non-bank corporation.  
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Depositors’ intention that banks lend on their money is 
indisputable  in the case of term accounts, but even in the case 
of instant access accounts, depositors (quite understandably) 
place their money whenever possible, with banks that pay 
interest on instant access accounts as well, or at least use 
interest to defray the costs of administering those accounts.  
But for some strange reason, governments offer taxpayer 
backed deposit insurance for those “commercial” bank 
depositors, but not for those who place money with mutual 
funds, stock-brokers and so on. That is a blatant inconsistency. 
To illustrate the inconsistency in the starkest possible way, if 
you lend to a non-bank  corporation by buying its bonds, there 
is no taxpayer backed insurance for you, but if you deposit 
money at a bank (i.e. lend to a bank) and the bank lends to 
non-bank corporations (which most banks do) then you’re 
protected by taxpayer backed insurance!  
Moreover, in going for the former option, i.e. buying a non-bank 
corporation’s bonds you are cutting out middlemen, i.e. banks. 
Or should I say, you are cutting out a bunch of recession 
causing middlemen who have repeatedly been found breaking 
the law. You’d think that if government is going to interfere in 
any way here, it would l actually reward those who cut out the 
middleman, rather than assist those middlemen, which is what 
governments do at the moment. 
There is however a simple solution to that inconsistency, which 
is to draw a sharp distinction between depositors who wish in 
effect to be money lenders and those who do not. That is, it 
would be perfectly feasible to have two categories of bank 
account. First there could be accounts for “commercial 
depositors” where there is no deposit insurance, and second 
there could be totally safe accounts for those who want safe 
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accounts, where money is not loaned on and where money is 
totally safe. Note that under that system, “commercial 
depositors” in effect become shareholders in the bank in that if 
the loans made by the bank turn out to be incompetent, then 
the commercial depositors bear the cost. 
But the latter “two types of account” system is exactly what full 
reserve has always consisted of! For example, as Fisher (1936) 
put it, “This means that in practice each commercial bank would 
be split into two departments, one a warehouse for money, the 
checking department, and the other the money lending 
department….” 
Incidentally, it might possibly be argued that if 
“commercialness” is the guiding principle here, employers 
should not have a right to safe accounts since they are by 
definition into commerce, while individual people should have 
that right and on the grounds that having a totally safe way of 
storing and transferring money is a basic human right. On the 
other hand most advocates of full reserve seem to assume that 
employers should be able to make use of safe accounts. 
There is certainly a debate to be had on that point. However 
that is a relatively minor point which will not be considered any 
further here.  
Another incidental point is that clearly there are a plenty of 
objections that have been raised to full reserve, but I will not 
deal with any of them here because I dealt with lots of them in 
section 2 of Musgrave (2014).  
Note that there is actually a more recent edition of Musgrave 
(2014) about to be published by “KSP Books” at the time of 
writing, and the layout and presentation will probably be a bit 
better than what you will find at the relevant link given in the 
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references section below. However, the latter section 2 in the 
2018 version of the book is actually the same as the version in 
the earlier edition, so you won’t miss much by looking at the 
earlier version.  
 
What’s wrong with deposit insurance if it pays for itself? 
In the US, the deposit insurance system, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is self-funding. That is, it charges 
banks an insurance premium which varies with the perceived 
riskiness of those banks. And that raises an obvious possible 
objection to abolishing deposit insurance, namely that if 
something is commercially viable, it is arguably not obvious 
what is wrong with it. 
The answer to that is that the FDIC is what might be called a 
“Rolls Royce” insurer in that it is backed by the US taxpayer. 
That is, everyone knows that if the FDIC fails, the US taxpayer 
will be forced to bail it out. In other words the FDIC is not a 
normal commercial insurer. 
Second, the FDIC only caters for small and medium size banks. 
In other words when large banks fail or seem to be in trouble, it 
is the Fed which comes to the rescue, and the trillion or so 
dollars worth of loans granted by the Fed in the recent crises 
were most certainly not at the “penalty rates” advocated by 
Walter Bagehot. They were not even at anything which might 
be remotely called a “commercially viable” rate. They were at a 
near zero rate! 
In short, the US deposit insurance system as a whole is not 
commercially viable. 
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Another problem with the “commercially viable” excuse for 
deposit insurance, is that if that excuse is accepted, then the 
same argument can be applied to having taxpayer backed 
insurance for those put money in to mutual funds, private 
pension funds and the other modes of saving mentioned above.  
Moreover, the excuse often given for deposit insurance, namely 
that it encourages lending and thus increases investment can 
perfectly well be applied to the latter mutual funds etc and can 
even be extended to stock exchange quoted shares.  
So there is clearly a problem in knowing where to draw the line 
here. The basic argument of this paper is that there is a very 
clear natural dividing line between commercial and non-
commercial activities, and that is where the line should be 
drawn. 
____________ 
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